VitalikButerin continued through the strawmap's quantum section: consensus BLS signatures, KZG data availability, EOA ECDSA signatures and application ZK proofs are the four quantum vulnerable parts, to be handled step by step. SirSpudlington submitted EIP-7932 public key and signature separation and argued on Magicians that there are too many post-quantum transaction migration proposals. zksecurityXYZ reported the first exploits against live ZK circuits, caused by Groth16 verifiers deployed without completing the trusted setup.
VitalikButerin: the quantum resistance roadmap; four parts of Ethereum are quantum vulnerable today, consensus BLS signatures, data availability KZG commitments and proofs, EOA ECDSA signatures and application ZK proofs, to be tackled step by step, 00:35; tcoratger: the consensus layer relies on BLS aggregation and how hash based replacements work, 02:41.
(SirSpudlington), submitted: moves secp256k1 to 0x0 from 0xff, restricts algorithm types above 126, adds merge_detached_signature and fixes a public key collision with secp256k1; Magicians: Post Quantum migrations, crypto agility and how to prevent EIP-7932 from failing (SirSpudlington), 05:28, listing many routes doing the same thing, from pure ERC-4337 to EIP-6404 SSZ transactions.
EIP-7932: add support for public key and signature separation (SirSpudlington), submitted: moves secp256k1 to 0x0 from 0xff, restricts algorithm types above 126, adds merge_detached_signature and fixes a public key collision with secp256k1; Magicians: Post Quantum migrations, crypto agility and how to prevent EIP-7932 from failing (SirSpudlington), 05:28, listing many routes doing the same thing, from pure ERC-4337 to EIP-6404 SSZ transactions.
Magicians: EIP-8175 Composable Transaction thread, 23:50; Magicians: the real blocker for post-quantum Ethereum is not the math but aggregation, 07:06.
23:15; ameensol: people write privacy by default roadmaps but will not implement a Poseidon precompile, which Solana, Starknet and Stellar have, 14:08.
ZksecurityXYZ: the first two known exploits of live ZK circuits came from Groth16 verifiers deployed without completing the trusted setup; one was white hat rescued for about $1.5M and the other drained for 5 ETH, 23:15; ameensol: people write privacy by default roadmaps but will not implement a Poseidon precompile, which Solana, Starknet and Stellar have, 14:08.