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Ethereum Research Daily

Ethereum Research Daily

ACDT #103 heard the audit results on the Glamsterdam repricing. ChainSecurity and the EF's internal search found about 200 issues between them, most of them easy to mitigate, but the call didn't decide whether to pull EIP-8037 from Amsterdam and left that to ACDE on 11-19. Vitalik came out in support of EIP-8037 and listed protocol features he expects to change, including a stateful ecrecover and possibly EIP-8141 as the only transaction type. He also says he's now a "total bull" on the leanPCS route for EIP-8288, which is on the agenda for tonight's Frame Transaction Breakout #8 at 21:00.

Image for November 17, 2026

Image: ethresear.ch, Manuel B. Santos (MultiVM Labs)

Glamsterdam repricing: ACDT #103 audit results and Vitalik's position

recording

The ACDT #103 meeting summary went up on Magicians at 00:03 on 2026-11-17 (an auto-generated Zoom summary, with a few names and EIP numbers transcribed wrong), along with the recording. Key points:

https://youtu.be/ltmaae3DFY0

Vitalik replying on airdrops and state costs

At 13:15 on 2026-11-16: airdrops are already advised to use Merkle trees (the issuer posts the root and each user pays to claim), and longer term token balances should live in UTXOs and, for privacy, keyed nonces. In another reply at 13:18 he says apps will retool toward more computation and less state in the medium run, and execution-heavy apps such as privacy protocols will get bolder about using more.

https://x.com/VitalikButerin/status/2122211943398449206

another reply

Vitalik replying on airdrops and state costs at 13:15 on 2026-11-16: airdrops are already advised to use Merkle trees (the issuer posts the root and each user pays to claim), and longer term token balances should live in UTXOs and, for privacy, keyed nonces. In another reply at 13:18 he says apps will retool toward more computation and less state in the medium run, and execution-heavy apps such as privacy protocols will get bolder about using more.

https://x.com/VitalikButerin/status/2122212649320759507

pcaversaccio's long comment on the ACDT #103 issue

At 17:31 on 2026-11-16 (plus an X post at 17:34): don't confuse consensus compatibility with application compatibility. Some of the eight assumptions in glamsterdam-gas-invariants concern execution semantics such as refunds, nested calls, reverts and gasleft(), which can affect control flow and security, and they weren't treated as first-class invariants in the spec and validation process early enough.

https://github.com/ethereum/pm/issues/2299#issuecomment-6913931359

X post

Pcaversaccio's long comment on the ACDT #103 issue at 17:31 on 2026-11-16 (plus an X post at 17:34): don't confuse consensus compatibility with application compatibility. Some of the eight assumptions in glamsterdam-gas-invariants concern execution semantics such as refunds, nested calls, reverts and gasleft(), which can affect control flow and security, and they weren't treated as first-class invariants in the spec and validation process early enough.

https://x.com/pcaversaccio/status/2122277228855836959

milonite on create-and-destroy refunds

At 19:56 on 2026-11-16: EIP-8037 still charges the full 183,600 state gas for account creation when a contract is created and self-destructed in the same transaction. CREATE goes from 32,000 to about 195,600 gas (roughly 6x), and whole transactions using the pattern cost 1.6x to 2.8x more. The pattern is used for temporary deposit addresses and similar flows, at about 2,100 contracts a day on mainnet (2026-11-06), up from about 1,200 in August. The original refund section was removed by PR #11611 in May 2026 and the proposal to restore it, PR #12249, was closed. The author asks for it to be reconsidered and notes TCREATE (EIP-8360) isn't in Glamsterdam and can't replace addresses already issued.

https://github.com/ethereum/pm/issues/2299#issuecomment-6917033995

EIP-8288 and leanPCS: an aggregation path for post-quantum signatures and privacy proofs

ethresear.ch: benchmarking post-quantum signature aggregation for EIP-8288

At 23:33 on 2026-11-16. manel1874 of MultiVM Labs proved verification of five schemes under leanVM (Falcon-512, ML-DSA-44, FORS, Raccoon-128 and Raccoon-G) on an Apple M4 Pro with 24 GiB. The first four fit in a single leanSTARK; Raccoon-G needs about 839 million witness words against a 268 million cap, so it was split into five proofs and aggregated recursively. In single-signature runs only Falcon-512 and FORS peaked below 4 GiB of memory, which makes them the plausible browser candidates. The post sketches a flow where the wallet signs locally and an untrusted external aggregator produces the proof, and notes that LEANSTARK_SCHEME is still reserved in the 8288 draft and MAX_LEANSTARK_DEPS_PER_WRAPPER=1 would need revisiting. The author also cited these numbers in the EIP-8288 discussion thread at 23:42.

https://ethresear.ch/t/exploring-post-quantum-signature-aggregation-for-eip-8288/26261

EIP-8288 discussion thread

Ethresear.ch: benchmarking post-quantum signature aggregation for EIP-8288 at 23:33 on 2026-11-16. manel1874 of MultiVM Labs proved verification of five schemes under leanVM (Falcon-512, ML-DSA-44, FORS, Raccoon-128 and Raccoon-G) on an Apple M4 Pro with 24 GiB. The first four fit in a single leanSTARK; Raccoon-G needs about 839 million witness words against a 268 million cap, so it was split into five proofs and aggregated recursively. In single-signature runs only Falcon-512 and FORS peaked below 4 GiB of memory, which makes them the plausible browser candidates. The post sketches a flow where the wallet signs locally and an untrusted external aggregator produces the proof, and notes that LEANSTARK_SCHEME is still reserved in the 8288 draft and MAX_LEANSTARK_DEPS_PER_WRAPPER=1 would need revisiting. The author also cited these numbers in the EIP-8288 discussion thread at 23:42.

https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-8288-frame-type-for-pq-sig-and-stark-aggregation/28723

Frame transaction accounts: mempool rules, permission levels and key recovery

EIP-8151 PR #12653 merged

At 17:09 on 2026-11-16, adding public mempool rules. EIP-8151 makes ecRecover return a result only for accounts with no code or an EIP-7702 delegation, so an EIP-8141 validation prefix that calls it depends on a third party's code. The new rules record each recovered address and its code class as a signer dependency (except tx.sender) and revalidate when the class changes. They cap pending transactions per recovered address in two shares: recoveries over this transaction's signature hash, TXPARAM(0x08), use a reserved share, while other digests get a smaller one, because anyone can replay an old signature. Paymaster recoveries count once per paymaster.

https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/12653

EIP-8141 PR #12668

Opened by nerolation at 14:00 on 2026-11-16: a SPHINCS account puts its signature in an ARBITRARY entry with an empty msg, and its VERIFY frame reads it with SIGDATACOPY, checks it against the signature hash and its public key, and approves. No new signature scheme is needed.

https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/pull/12668

ERC-8499 discussion

20:26 to 20:28 on 2026-11-16. Author johba addressed two points. A signature count is state and a phrase restores none, so for key types whose limit could realistically be reached, the phrase-derived key should only certify other keys and each device should sign with its own. And when a restore finds no key in use, the wallet should say which key types it tried and that another wallet might find keys it didn't.

https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/erc-8499-hash-based-key-derivation-from-bip-39/30375

Other updates

Data breach at Trezor shipping partner Skladon

Reported by The Block on 2026-11-16: names, phone numbers, addresses, emails and purchase details for about 27,000 orders placed from 2026-08-09 to 11-07 were exported. Trezor's systems and wallet backups weren't affected, but some customers have already had scam calls. If you ordered in that window, treat any order-related contact as suspicious and never share your recovery phrase.

https://trezor.io/blog/news/data-breach-at-trezor-shipping-partner-skladon

The Block

Data breach at Trezor shipping partner Skladon, reported by The Block on 2026-11-16: names, phone numbers, addresses, emails and purchase details for about 27,000 orders placed from 2026-08-09 to 11-07 were exported. Trezor's systems and wallet backups weren't affected, but some customers have already had scam calls. If you ordered in that window, treat any order-related contact as suspicious and never share your recovery phrase.

https://www.theblock.co/news/business/2026-11-16-trezor-hit-another-shipping-partner-data-leak-affecting-27000-skladon-orders-441524

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