Frame Transaction Breakout #8 summary
The Frame Transaction Breakout #8 summary went up at 23:06 on 2026-11-17 (an auto-generated Zoom summary that mangles names like Hegotá, Besu and leanSPHINCS), along with the recording. Key points:
Ethereum Research Daily
Frame Transaction Breakout #8 was mostly about staying forward compatible with EIP-8288. Iván said on the call he'd open a draft, and afterwards ilitteri submitted an EIP for leanSPHINCS dependency frames, where signatures travel beside the transaction and can later be swapped for an aggregate proof. The call agreed to lock down EIP-8151 and EIP-8298 (SETCODEFROM) first. soispoke published a long post arguing against dropping FOCIL and other features from Hegotá in the name of pqai, and worked out that an unchanged FOCIL could force at most 16 leanSPHINCS transactions into a block. ACDE #249 meets tomorrow at 21:00 to cover Glamsterdam and Hegotá.

Image: LambdaClass blog
The Frame Transaction Breakout #8 summary went up at 23:06 on 2026-11-17 (an auto-generated Zoom summary that mangles names like Hegotá, Besu and leanSPHINCS), along with the recording. Key points:
The Frame Transaction Breakout #8 summary went up at 23:06 on 2026-11-17 (an auto-generated Zoom summary that mangles names like Hegotá, Besu and leanSPHINCS), along with the recording. Key points:
Opened by ilitteri at 21:14 on 2026-11-17:
At 19:44 on 2026-11-17: on the Daisugi devnet, checking a keccak-based leanSPHINCS signature in the EVM costs about 60k gas in VERIFY, and one-time WOTS keys cost 64k to 66k. Two signers don't fit under the 100k cap. He also found two places where the devnet differs from the EIP text.
At 01:39 on 2026-11-18: LambdaClass's ethrex will help implement and test the execution-layer changes needed for new user signatures and publish benchmarks so wallet and client teams can weigh the tradeoffs. It backs the goal of being post-quantum ready by the end of 2028.
. The PR's rationale: a groth16 privacy pool needs 233,000 to 235,800 gas for its validation prefix, and hash-based signature verifiers written in EVM code need 101k to 223k in a VERIFY frame. Per the Nethermind benchmark, about 100 failing transactions per second per peer at a 300k cap adds a worst case of 24 to 25 ms to block building, exactly the 25 ms budget.
At 04:24 on 2026-11-18 brought Nethermind measurements. The builder used to execute every IL entry, VERIFY included. Under EIP-7805's byte limits (16 ILs × 8 KiB, 2,624 minimal frame transactions per slot), going from a 100k to a 300k cap took per-slot time from 223 ms to 670 ms with a cheap loop, or from 3.2 s to 9.7 s with KECCAK256 over 4 KiB. Running only the entries EIP-8369's fill rule admits brings the worst case to 0.20 to 0.29 s per slot, and it no longer grows with the cap. He's still worried that tail truncation can leave a transaction unprotected even though it's in an IL.
At 23:12 on 2026-11-17 (Magicians version at 23:10):
Soispoke: thoughts on pqai, Hegotá and FOCIL at 23:12 on 2026-11-17 (Magicians version at 23:10):
Discussion on draft EIP PR #12663: FOCIL omission witnesses for frame transactions: at 16:16 on 2026-11-17 soispoke suggested simply pointing to EIP-8369's notion of "position-stable" transactions, and warned that with a shared paymaster a builder can send its own sponsored transactions first and drain the balance. At 03:13 AnkushinDaniil proposed that the paymaster keep a "released" counter that only goes up, stored in the upper 96 bits of slot 0 so no new storage slot is needed.
At 14:36 on 2026-11-17: split verification into a NON_STATE part (signature or proof, checked once when the IL arrives and cached) and a STATE part (key binding, nonces, roots, payer). That would remove the builder-chosen index from AA-VOPS and let frame transactions use the same end-of-block check. The call agreed to keep discussing it async.
The FOCIL Breakout #46 summary went up at 22:07 on 2026-11-17 (EIPsInsight recap at 23:06): consensus-specs PR #5769 got the green light, with a merge planned for the next call; the group discussed IL timing, the retention window (#5785 extends it from 2 to 3 slots) and proposer deadlines. Next week's FOCIL Breakout #47 (11-24) is dedicated to PQ FOCIL.
The FOCIL Breakout #46 summary went up at 22:07 on 2026-11-17 (EIPsInsight recap at 23:06): consensus-specs PR #5769 got the green light, with a merge planned for the next call; the group discussed IL timing, the retention window (#5785 extends it from 2 to 3 slots) and proposer deadlines. Next week's FOCIL Breakout #47 (11-24) is dedicated to PQ FOCIL.
The FOCIL Breakout #46 summary went up at 22:07 on 2026-11-17 (EIPsInsight recap at 23:06): consensus-specs PR #5769 got the green light, with a merge planned for the next call; the group discussed IL timing, the retention window (#5785 extends it from 2 to 3 slots) and proposer deadlines. Next week's FOCIL Breakout #47 (11-24) is dedicated to PQ FOCIL.
At 13:21 on 2026-11-17. johba took up yesterday's "management bit" idea, built a third version of the account and ran it on Daisugi next to the old one on the same day:
At 01:39 on 2026-11-18 that Slots16 accounts can change their code, so he'll keep them on target checks only, without selector checks.
At 20:54 on 2026-11-17. it44 recomputed the SLOTS16 leaf, node and root vectors with a separate keccak256 implementation and every one matched, but found the reference account was missing the authorityRoot() function and AuthorityStateChanged event the spec requires. The author replied at 01:39 that both are now added, with a test.
Magicians: an independent check of ERC-8403 at 20:54 on 2026-11-17. it44 recomputed the SLOTS16 leaf, node and root vectors with a separate keccak256 implementation and every one matched, but found the reference account was missing the authorityRoot() function and AuthorityStateChanged event the spec requires. The author replied at 01:39 that both are now added, with a test.
Got a review at 17:32 on 2026-11-17. The EIP lets a validator's withdrawal address register 32 bytes of PQ material, stored in the beacon state for a future migration fork. The reviewer pointed out that whoever owns the withdrawal address often isn't the operator (contracts, custodians, delegated staking) and suggested adding a path triggered by the BLS key. Otherwise contracts need upgrades, custodians need to support a new transaction, and delegators need to coordinate with operators, all of which would slow the migration.
Tonight at 21:00. jtraglia says these calls are coworking sessions every Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday, focused on whatever consensus-layer PQ issue is most pressing that day.
Is at 21:00 on 11-19, with Glamsterdam, Hegotá and misc on the agenda. Whether to keep EIP-8037 is expected to come up there.
At 16:56 on 2026-11-17: once VOPS nodes drop most execution-layer state, today's state tree means they can't serve sync proofs to peers. A new tree (EIP-8297) would let them prove the state they do hold. For node operators, low-spec nodes look viable down the road, but the question of who keeps the full state is still open.
At 21:27 on 2026-11-17. The author added simulation data: actual base fee volatility from February to May 2026 was 0.0554. Under EIP-7999, 99% of a block's base fee comes from state charges, and the state fee is fairly volatile (about 0.15) because there's no state gas limit.
At 18:57 on 2026-11-17, now referencing Gloas execution requests. EIP-8411 PR #12671 at 15:04 proposes spreading payload chunks over Waggle.
EIP-7807 update merged at 18:57 on 2026-11-17, now referencing Gloas execution requests. EIP-8411 PR #12671 at 15:04 proposes spreading payload chunks over Waggle.
At 09:41 on 2026-11-17: an ERC-20 extension with oracle-permissioned transfers validated by zero-knowledge proofs of payment instructions. ERC-8376 moved to Review at 14:37: detection and remediation of token launch abuse.
ERC-7963 moved to Last Call at 09:41 on 2026-11-17: an ERC-20 extension with oracle-permissioned transfers validated by zero-knowledge proofs of payment instructions. ERC-8376 moved to Review at 14:37: detection and remediation of token launch abuse.
At 19:04 on 2026-11-17, and EthSystems explained at 18:22 that it grew out of the EF's institutional privacy task force. Institutions that need to keep data confidential while staying compliant can start there and contact the team directly.
Ethereum.org launched an institutional privacy guide at 19:04 on 2026-11-17, and EthSystems explained at 18:22 that it grew out of the EF's institutional privacy task force. Institutions that need to keep data confidential while staying compliant can start there and contact the team directly.
At 01:09 on 2026-11-18. It's free, open source, available for Chrome and Firefox, and shows whether each send stays private before you confirm.
At 01:01 on 2026-11-18, so DAOs and institutions can combine multisig with privacy on Starknet.
(X post at 03:48 on 2026-11-18), the second post in its post-quantum series. Neither hardware wallets nor multisigs stop a quantum attacker, and it covers how ethrex and ethlambda are testing the migration.
LambdaClass: what a cryptographic break would mean for Ethereum (X post at 03:48 on 2026-11-18), the second post in its post-quantum series. Neither hardware wallets nor multisigs stop a quantum attacker, and it covers how ethrex and ethlambda are testing the migration.
At 23:21 on 2026-11-17: 788k active validators, the lowest since 2023-09-10, with 45% (24k) on the 0x02 compounding type.
At 04:06 on 2026-11-18: 85 incidents triaged in a week. Infrastructure exploits cost $23M plus 335 SOL, seed compromises $7.46M plus 30.07 ETH, and malware $4.46M. They also logged 3,176 phishing domains.
At 00:12 on 2026-11-18: 1,142,260 AI agents or services use ERC-8004, mostly spam. Celo has just over 10,000 registrations but more high-scoring agents with unique reviewers than Base, which has over a million.
At 23:13 on 2026-11-17. The original EFDevcon post says it moves by one day, to October 12 to 14 at CCL in Lisbon.
The EF reposted the Devcon 9 date change at 23:13 on 2026-11-17. The original EFDevcon post says it moves by one day, to October 12 to 14 at CCL in Lisbon.
At 17:43 on 2026-11-17, linking Mozilla's analysis. He argues that AI is making this a hard period for cybersecurity, which makes it even more important to cut backdoors and mass data collection. In a reply at 18:29 he notes that senators use Signal too, and whoever controls the backdoors could selectively expose people's secrets.
Vitalik urges opposition to Canada's C-22 bill at 17:43 on 2026-11-17, linking Mozilla's analysis. He argues that AI is making this a hard period for cybersecurity, which makes it even more important to cut backdoors and mass data collection. In a reply at 18:29 he notes that senators use Signal too, and whoever controls the backdoors could selectively expose people's secrets.
Vitalik urges opposition to Canada's C-22 bill at 17:43 on 2026-11-17, linking Mozilla's analysis. He argues that AI is making this a hard period for cybersecurity, which makes it even more important to cut backdoors and mass data collection. In a reply at 18:29 he notes that senators use Signal too, and whoever controls the backdoors could selectively expose people's secrets.
At 18:52 on 2026-11-17: Q-day, when a quantum computer can break ECDSA, and the migration deadline.
At 03:17 on 2026-11-18: if the network holds $550B and stays up for the next six months, he expects people and institutions to race to deposit there.
At 21:20 on 2026-11-17, pointing out that even Monero trades on regulated US exchanges.